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 Abstract 
Since its inception, donor conception practices have been a reproductive choice for the infertile. Past and 
current practices have the potential to cause significant and lifelong harm to the offspring through loss of 
kinship, heritage, identity, family health history and possibly introducing physical problems. Legislation 
and regulation in Australia that specifies that the welfare of the child born as a consequence of donor 
conception is paramount may therefore be in conflict with the outcomes. Altering the paradigm to a child 
centric model however, impinges on reproductive choice and rights of adults involved in the process. With 
some lobby groups pushing for increased reproductive choice while others emphasise offspring rights there 
is a dichotomy of interests that society and legislators need to address. Concepts pertaining to a shift 
towards a child centric paradigm are discussed. 
 
Key Words: Reproductive Techniques, Assisted, Ethics, Policy, Child Welfare  
Discipline: Bioethics: Medical ethics 
Topic Area: Health policy 
 
Introduction 
Choosing when, who with, and how we procreate is often viewed as an inalienable human 
freedom. It is this freedom to reproduce that has been a cornerstone of society and family life. For those 
suffering from infertility, the introduction and implementation of donor conception (DC) finally enabled 
many to create the family they wished for. While the infertile were free legally to procreate they were 
thwarted biologically. Donor conception provided them with increased freedom to procreate, to choose to 
start a family via a treatment process if that was their wish. They had improved choice and control over 
their family creation. 
 Ethical, moral and legal perspectives of DC practices became institutionalised in Australia during 
the 1980’s when the first legislations concerning this form of fertility treatment were enacted. Legislation 
varies considerably between Australian states, providing a mosaic of disproportionate rights to donor 
conceived offspring. A situation aptly described by Schneller (2005, 244), as ‘chaotic’. The psychological 
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and medical welfare of any donor conceived person hinges on these rights and subsequently the very state 
that they were conceived in, and or the era of their conception due to the ever changing landscape of 
legislation and regulations. During this early bureaucratic period there were suggestions that the physical, 
medical and psychological wellbeing of a child may be dependent on the ability to find out information on 
the donating progenitor(s) (Rowland 1985, 391; Vetri 1988, 520). Additionally it was suggested that policy 
should be predicated by the best interests of the child (Annas 1981, 161) and disclosure should follow the 
precedent set by adoption (Brandon and Warner 1977, 338). If we are to uphold the claim that offspring 
have certain rights such as to know their genetic origins (Freeman 1996, 291), then the current practice of 
DC does not accommodate such a right consistently (Frith 2001, 484). Subsequently the freedom of 
procreation in this context has the potential to adversely affect the rights of donor conceived offspring. 
 Should the potential for a donor conceived child/person to suffer negative outcomes thereby 
influence or hinder an adult’s freedom to procreate as they see fit? This paper seeks to address this question 
within the Australian context by focusing on the child’s outcomes. 
 
Current Procreative Freedoms 
A broad definition of procreative autonomy as prescribed by Robertson (1983, 406) is the freedom 
of choice to either bring or not bring a child into the world. Refining this freedom within a DC legal 
framework may be more accurately described as the ability to produce a child with the assistance of third 
party(s) that is not prohibited by law. In effect, any person who fulfills the eligibility requirements to 
receive fertility treatment from a clinic in Australia could be viewed as having the procreative freedom to 
conceive a child through DC. There are many who are now also conducting DC within their own homes 
implementing private arrangements however these will not form part of the discussion as these 
arrangements fall outside of legislation. While there may be some people who are also technically unable to 
conceive a child through this technique, they are not excluded based on law or regulation. The 
aforementioned refined definition of procreative freedom of adults in the context of DC will be used for 
this analysis. 
 The ability to start a family may unfortunately have little to do with choice but situational 
circumstances and our biological ability to produce viable gametes, a subsequent embryo and to carry it to 
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term. Nature does not provide this as an automatic right, rather a biological function that not everyone is 
capable of. Donor conception is a means to an end, a choice that circumvents infertility. It provides genetic 
continuity for one partner which is seen as on overriding and important concern for these parents when 
opting for DC over adoption (Milsom and Bergman 1982, 128; Daniels 2004, 63), and this biological 
connection to a child is the reason why couples will choose a process such as intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI) over donor insemination (Schover et al. 1996, 2464), even if there is the possibility of a son 
inheriting his father’s infertility as a result. An over-riding biological and social desire to raise children 
forces these parents to make decisions about their child that parents are not normally faced with. 
 Once these parent(s) have decided to utilise DC, they are then faced with more choices and 
freedoms. Choice of clinics, which state or country to conceive in (reproductive tourism) as each may have 
differing legislation or regulations, which donor to use (some clinics may implement donor catalogues), 
whether or not they intend to tell the child of their origins and if so when, and whether or not to tell anyone 
else about their choices. This would normally fall into a parent’s freedom of choice, however, due to the 
complexities and profound effects that this can have on the child, do would-be parents ethically or morally 
have such freedoms? 
 Before the complexities or potential harms of being donor conceived can be analysed and used as 
arguments for or against unconstrained procreative freedoms utilising DC, we must establish whether or not 
a child’s interests can outweigh those of an adult and what framework is to be used for this analysis. 
 
Child Welfare Paramountcy 
It is proposed that there is a moral and ethical duty of care to ensure that the wellbeing of any child 
created through assisted reproductive technologies (ART) including donor conception, is of paramount 
importance. One of the first states to legislate in this field, South Australia (1988, 7), also documented this 
countenance by stating; “The welfare of any child to be born in consequence of an artificial fertilisation 
procedure must be treated as of paramount importance, and accepted as a fundamental principle.” This 
principle has since also been echoed in Victoria (1995, 14) and the NHMRC Guidelines (2004, 9), while 
Western Australia (1991, 13) requires that the interests and welfare of the child be taken into consideration. 
The only other state to have legislation in this field, New South Wales (2007, s38), only refers to the 
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welfare of the child in respect to receiving contact from the donor and in relation to adults who have a 
genuine interest in the welfare of the child, but not the welfare of the child as a general principle of the Act. 
It is the intentionality of procreation through an institutionalised and publicly funded medical procedure 
that instills a higher level of responsibility on all parties involved, whether they are commissioning parents, 
donors, clinicians, clinics or government. An analogous elevated duty of care is evident in the field of 
adoption in Australia whereby adoptive parents undergo screening and assessment of their suitability to 
parent an adoptee because the state has played an active role in the placement of that child. For the 
aforementioned states and regulating body, this principle of duty of care in DC appears to have found 
resonance.  
 While constraints on procreation occurring within natural conception is deemed unethical, to apply 
the same rationale to a completely artificial construct which incorporates the input of another person (sperm 
or egg donation) or two other people (embryo donation) could be viewed as unsound. The addition of third 
parties has the potential to cloud the relationship between the commissioning parents, between these 
parents and the child, as well as having profound and life-long effects on the offspring. Therefore DC 
requires a greater duty of care by the states. As the states already have a duty of care to children in general 
then a supposition could be that donor conceived children would be appropriately cared for by existing 
legal frameworks and therefore do not require additional consideration. However, the possibility to induce 
harm (to be discussed later) as a direct result of these procreative freedoms suggest further consideration is 
required. So how should we analyse the potential harms in light of the child welfare paramountcy 
principle? 
 
Applying Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 
In an analysis of procreative actions, McDougall (2007) uses neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to 
create 3 Parental Virtues (3PVs) which can then be used to determine if reproductive choices are right or 
wrong based on whether a virtuous person/parent would choose them. The neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics 
concerns itself with virtuous character and the flourishing of the human being. It has already been 
established that the welfare or flourishing of the child is paramount through either legislation or regulation 
in Australia and as such McDougall’s 3PV framework is a suitable model for analysis. It should be noted 
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that the child welfare paramountcy principle and the 3PVs certainly does not preclude the flourishing or 
interests of parents, just that when there is conflict that the child’s interests should take precedence. The 
implementation of McDougall’s framework may be more difficult in other jurisdictions around the world 
where this welfare paramountcy principle is not enshrined. 
Briefly McDougall’s 3PVs are: 
1) Acceptingness – that the parent will accept the child for whoever or whatever that child is or 
represents. 
2) Committedness – that the parent undertakes the responsibility to actively parent the child and 
to be there for the child. 
3) Future-agent-focus – the principle that the fetus and child will become adults one day and 
agents of their own free will, such that the parenting and the decisions made in regard to the 
child should not adversely interfere with the child’s current and future opportunities, but 
should also be value structured to reinforce virtue and morals.  
McDougall’s premise is that this framework should be used to determine whether a virtuous 
parent would do something and not based on whether the action will harm anyone. It is my postulation that 
a virtuous parent in the aim of being virtuous would want to know of any potential harm(s) to their child so 
as to ensure that they make the appropriate decisions in the best interests of their children. This is the duty 
of care any committed parent undertakes in the day to day care of their child to assess levels of risk and 
therefore is not confined to reproductive choices. As such the 3PVs can be used for analysis in conjunction 
with a harms based approach. 
 
Potential Harms of Being Donor Conceived 
Procreative freedoms implementing DC have the ability to produce outcomes for the child that 
would not normally be encountered by naturally conceived children. Therefore it is important to assess 
these outcomes to determine if they are serious enough to warrant a review and or reduction in these 
freedoms based on the 3PVs. However, given that parents of donor conceived children go to great lengths 
to have them (Lorbach 2003, Daniels 2004), it could be argued that they have already passed the 
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committedness test and therefore the potential harms will be weighed up against the remaining 2 Parental 
Virtues.  
i) Deception of their Origins 
Current practice centers around identity release donors and encouragement for the recipient couple 
to tell the offspring about their conception and to tell early (Johnson and Kane 2007, 119). Yet studies 
(Golombok et al. 2002, 966; Broderick and Walker 2001, 34; Brewaeys et al. 1997, 1593; Rumball and 
Adair 1999, 1395; Lycett et al. 2005, 813) reveal that the majority of parents are unwilling to disclose and 
prefer to keep the secret. Non-disclosure is typically coupled by a belief that the child does not need to 
know and that keeping the secret protects the child (Murray and Golombok 2003, 93). During the infancy 
of DC practice, the trend was to use anonymous donation and for recipients not to tell. Irrespective of the 
period in which they were conceived, the majority will therefore not be aware of their DC status. The 
freedom for parents to parent as they see fit, which also includes the choice to disclose, is something that 
governments are extremely disinclined to legislate in. Certainly the Victorian Law Reform Committee 
(VLRC 2012, 64) in its inquiry into donor conception was reluctant to recommend the forcing of parents to 
inform their children of their DC status even though the committee felt that such knowledge was in the 
child’s best interest. Under current practice, most offspring will never seek information about their 
progenitor because they will be deprived of and shielded from the truth. 
 Parents who initially decided not to tell may change their mind in the future, disclosing their 
child’s method of conception (Daniels, Gillett, and Grace 2009, 1102). Parental attitudes towards disclosure 
over the years has changed considerably with the majority during the 1980s and 1990’s intending not to tell 
(Leeton and Backwell 1982, 308-309; Milsom and Bergman 1982, 127; Klock, Jacob, and Maier 1994, 
481; Durna et al. 1997, 257) while more recent evidence (Godman et al. 2006, 3025; MacDougall et al. 
2007, 526; Shehab et al. 2008, 181) has seen a reversal in this view. Intent however, does not always lead 
to actual disclosure even within families that support truth telling (Blyth and Ryll 2005, 4), and the majority 
are still not disclosing (Freeman and Golombok 2012, 197). The freedom of the parents in deciding to 
deceive the offspring about their conception potentially creates a psychologically and socially harmful 
environment that is ethically unacceptable (Landau 1998, 75), and creates a level of dysfunction in the 
family (Paul and Berger 2007, 2568). While improvements are being made in the realm of disclosure, at the 
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ethical and moral heart of the matter, if children are deceived then ‘’they are being wrongly treated” 
(Warnock 1987, 151).  
 There is an argument that if the children are deceived of their origins then there will be no harm 
caused to them, however Cowden (2012, 122) argues that the concept of ‘no harm, no foul’ (a term she 
uses to describe this), should not apply and that openness facilitates the respect that the offspring deserve. 
When donor conceived people have been asked whether they believe they should be told the truth of their 
conception, the majority do feel this way (Jadva et al. 2009, 1914), suggesting that not only should 
openness be practiced as a matter of principle but that it is how donor conceived people wish to be treated. 
 The origin of a person is central to who they are. It is the story of their coming into being. If a 
parent chooses to deceive the child of their origins I postulate that they are not entirely comfortable with 
the notion that the child is not biologically related to one or both of them and therefore they have not 
completely accepted the entirety of the child and everything that the child represents. The child may be 
seen as a reminder of their infertility. This less than full acceptance fails the acceptingness test and perhaps 
a more simplistic analysis is that we would commonly associate truthfulness and openness as being virtues 
rather than deception and lies.  
ii) Kinship Separation 
All offspring, irrespective of their knowledge of their conception are being separated from their 
next of kin on their donor’s side. For some that are aware of their conception this loss has the potential to 
be traumatic. The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) which provides the 
framework for clinic accreditation states that a donor conceived person is entitled to know their genetic 
parent(s) and stipulates that all clinics must not use donors unless they have consented to the release of 
identifying information (NHMRC 2004, 25). This stance was reaffirmed by the Australian Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee (SLCAC) inquiry into DC practices and whom recommended that 
there be nationally consistent legislation that ensured the right of a donor conceived person to access not 
only identifying information on their donor but also their donor half-siblings (SLCAC 2011, xi-xii). Clearly 
the importance of and reverence to biological kinship is being valued at the level of governance. 
 Additionally, the majority of offspring believe that they should know the identity of their donors 
(86% Scheib, Riordan, and Rubin 2005, 246; 87% Mahlstedt, Labounty, and Kennedy 2010, 2242; 77% 
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Jadva et al. 2010, 525) and also the identity of any half-siblings (89% Scheib, Riordan, and Rubin 2005, 
246; 78% Jadva et al. 2010, 525). The parity between the desire to know their progenitor and half-siblings 
exhibits the value that offspring put into all biological connections and not just with their progenitor. 
Discussion regarding offspring’s right to genealogy has typically centralised on the donor, rarely 
considering what is an equally important factor for them; the disassociation from their entire genetic family. 
The search and desire for biological family is not borne out through poor sociological parent relationships 
(Mahlstedt, Labounty, and Kennedy 2010, 2243), thereby also highlighting the importance of genetic 
kinship to the offspring. 
 If the importance of biological kinship is indeed profound and an intrinsic component of who we 
are as humans as suggested by the NHMRC and SLCAC, then surely the deprivation of this kinship is a 
failure to accept the child and the biological kin that make up their “complete” family, the entirety of who 
they are. However, I argue that this is not necessarily a failure on the parent’s part but rather one that has 
been forced upon them to a certain degree. As a general rule in Australia, a child will not be able to access 
identifying information on their donor until they reach 18 years of age, provided they have been informed 
of their conception and they choose to seek out this information. 
 For offspring that may eventually know and meet their donor, the knowledge and interactions 
obtained may not completely erase their trauma. They may still suffer a lingering loss of not sharing a life 
together, of not having the intimate knowledge of each other that family members do and of still feeling 
disconnectedness (Walker 2006, 26). This deprivation of interaction with the donor and associated kin 
(donor family) during a child’s formative years has reduced the ability for that child to form relationships 
with them that would be analogous to those normally associated with the immediate family. It has in effect 
reduced the child’s future options and fails the future-agent-focus test.  
 Complete acceptingness and future agent-focus has been failed but perhaps through no fault of the 
parent. A parent who wishes to provide their child with knowledge of the donor family is being prevented 
from doing so through bureaucracy and therefore in effect may still retain this virtue. Unless the model of 
DC information exchange is altered to allow earlier identification, this harm cannot be appropriately 
assessed under the 3PVs criteria.   
iii) Loss of Identity 
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Loss of kinship can equate to a loss of heritage and is also associated with identity loss (Weigert 
and Hastings 1977, 1171). Adolescence is a critical time for a person when forming their identity as it is the 
transition to adulthood and is often highlighted with confusion (Erikson 1968). The absence of one or both 
biological links clouds this process by removing the mirror that we see of ourselves, in our looks, 
personality and behavior that is evident in our progenitors and our kin. When approximately 41% of our 
behavior is inherited (Malouff, Rooke, and Schutte 2008, 155), it is a substantial sized mirror that is 
missing from these offspring’s lives. The right to an identity is as much about not being deceived as it is 
about knowing the truth of one’s origins (Freeman 1996, 288).  
 Discovering and even meeting ones progenitor after the age of 18 is potentially too late to avoid 
the damage associated with forcibly removing vital components of a person’s identity. These factors 
contribute to genealogical or genetic bewilderment (Sants 1964), resulting in a person whose own identity 
and place in the world remains unclear to them, putting them in a perpetual state of identity limbo. The 
genetic void created by lack of information about a biological parent is not in the best interests of a person 
psychologically (Cooper and Glazer 1994).  
 Not only do most offspring feel a strong need to know the identity of their donor but 62% would 
also like to meet him at least once (Mahlstedt, Labounty, and Kennedy 2010, 2239). Curiosity concerning 
the donor appears to slightly outweigh the need for identification, with 96.6% of offspring studied by 
Scheib, Riordan, and Rubin (2005, 246) desiring a picture of their donor and 89.7% wishing to know other 
non-identifying information such as vocation, marital status and children. This study focused on teenage 
offspring which is an important factor in considering identity formation in an individual with results 
suggesting that curiosity about the donor is intrinsically a component of the identity construction process 
for these teenagers. It could be postulated that the discrepancy between figures of curiosity about the donor 
and knowledge of their identity is the result of the imprinting onto and conditioning of many offspring 
under current and previous ideological climates as to having to feel grateful for their existence, to carry an 
existential debt (described by Rushbrooke 2004, 20; and Rose 2009, 75), and not wanting to interfere with 
the donor’s life and for fear of hurting the feelings of their raising parents (Lorbach 2003, 160). 
 One assessment of the identity loss harm is that it runs in parallel with the kinship loss harm. The 
two harms are linked through the lack of knowledge and interaction with the child’s donor family providing 
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the same outcome in the analysis against the 3PVs. An alternative approach is that unless the parents 
willfully force an identity construct on the child but rather let the child’s identity develop freely then they 
are being accepting of who the child chooses to become and therefore do not restrict the future-agent even 
though the identity and the paths the child may choose to take may be different if they had access to the 
donor family.  
iv) Late Discovery 
A compounding aspect is late discovery whereby offspring that find out in adulthood through open 
disclosure or extreme circumstances such as arguments, or after the death of a parent, have altered 
perceptions of identity and family, creating great distrust, confusion, feelings of deceit and possibly anger 
between themselves and those that withheld the truth from them (McWhinnie 2000, 18; Turner and Coyle 
2000, 2044-2045). It has been reported that less damage may occur by telling the child of their conception 
at an early age (Hewitt 2002, 16; Jadva et al. 2009, 1913), and is encouraged to occur before the identity 
construct window of adolescence occurs (Kirkman 2003, 2240). The emotional trauma associated with late 
discovery is similar to that occurring in the adoption community and may remain unresolved for several 
decades post-disclosure (Riley 2009, 157). 
 It is clear that some offspring have difficulty assimilating this new found information and dealing 
with the changed family and identity constructs that they had previously formed. A substantial argument is 
that if the donor conceived person wasn’t told of their conception then the harm would be avoided, 
however, this fails to satisfy Cowden and the offspring themselves. Yet dichotomously, disclosure has not 
only caused harm but reduced the neo-Aristotelian flourishing of the now adult. We can address this 
dilemma by returning to the remaining 2PVs. As outlined in the deception of origins harm, by not 
disclosing for a significant portion of the child’s life the parent has failed the acceptingness test even if this 
failure has been temporary. A similar temporary failure is the future-agent-focus as described in the kinship 
separation harm.  
v) Incomplete Medical Histories 
All offspring have incomplete medical histories in some form. Believing that a non-biological 
parent is in fact their progenitor is disadvantageous in any clinical setting which can result in poor 
diagnosis. Even when offspring are aware of their conception, an incomplete medical history through either 
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having no access to a progenitor’s medical history or access to one that is outdated also creates problems 
for any consulting physician. This lack of knowledge has serious implications for early diagnosis (Hastrup 
1985, 395; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004, 1044) and life-style choices for the offspring. 
Reports of how this can adversely affect a person’s health prospects were highlighted in the VLRC inquiry 
which showed that in 2011 there were 3 incidences of a donor or DC person unable to pass on medical 
information to those directly affected and in one instance a person was diagnosed with a terminal illness 
that possibly could have been screened and treated at an earlier stage if a health history was available 
(VLRC 2012, 54-55). 
Theoretically and evidentially there is a strong case for the provision of medical information to 
DC people. This is also mirrored in the majority of DC people desiring to have an updated medical history 
of their donor for their own physical health (Hewitt 2002, 17). For those who are unable to obtain medical 
information, some are resorting to expensive and in many instances, inconclusive genetic health analysis to 
provide some familial health history to enable lifestyle choices to be made (Adams and Lorbach 2012, 715).  
 In the instances of the previously mentioned harms, some dispute that those are sufficient grounds 
for altering the current paradigm. For example an argument is that non-disclosure will not lead to negative 
outcomes provided the child never knows about their conception and is raised in a loving home as 
previously discussed and also rejected by some. The non-disclosure effect postulation is difficult to 
determine empirically from studies of offspring unaware of their conception; the problem of unethical 
treatment of study participants who are unaware of why they are being studied. Additionally in the 
psychological and emotional wellbeing studies there can be a wide range of outcomes raising doubt. It is 
difficult to envisage however, that the deprivation of a medical health history can ever be viewed as 
justified in light of current understanding of how genetics can influence our physical wellbeing. Such 
deprivation would fail the future-agent-focus test as the child’s ability to flourish and remain in a physically 
healthy state can be severely hampered without knowledge of a complete familial health history. 
Interestingly while the majority of donors have for some time agreed to the release of medical records 
(Robinson et al. 1991, 307-308; Mahlstedt and Probasco 1991, 749), there is yet to be a system put in place 
that ensures that these records are updated and that vital information is disseminated to offspring and 
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recipient parents. Thereby any possibility of maintaining virtuous future-agent-focus becomes 
compromised over time. 
vi) Physical Harms 
Robertson describes conception as usually not being harmful in itself and therefore it could be 
argued that DC should be a procreative freedom if it is not harmful (1983, 463). However Robertson’s 
argument was written during a period where our medical knowledge of conception was rather limited 
compared to now. 
 Pre-eclampsia (hypertension during pregnancy) is a leading cause of fetal and maternal morbidity 
and mortality (Backes et al. 2011, 1). There is an increased risk of pre-eclampsia occurring in women that 
have become pregnant with the assistance of donated gametes or embryos (Smith et al. 1997, 457; Salha et 
al. 1999, 2270). These studies show that there is an underlying immune response to becoming pregnant 
with on oocyte that is not your own and to being impregnated with sperm that is not your partners as is 
supported by further evidence whereby further exposure to the same donor sperm reduces the risk of pre-
eclampsia as the immune system has become tolerant of the novel antigen (Kyrou et al. 2010, 1126-1127).  
 Current DC practice involves the use of frozen gametes so that appropriate screening of donors for 
transmissible diseases and certain genetic conditions can be undertaken. The mere manipulation of sperm in 
the laboratory introduces DNA fragmentation (Toro et al. 2009, 2110), as does cryopreservation (Zribi et al. 
2010, 162), and the thawing process (Gosalvez et al. 2009, 171-172). This sperm DNA fragmentation 
results in poorer embryo quality, as well as poorer fertilization and pregnancy rates (Simon et al. 2011, 
724). In some instances sperm DNA damage can be repaired after fertilization but it can also persist 
(Yamauchi, Riel, and Ward 2012, 237), suggesting that these changes can be carried on into the resulting 
embryo or child. As cryopreservation induced DNA damage is primarily mediated by oxidative stress 
(Thomson et al. 2009, 2069), and that oxidative stress induced damage is linked with childhood cancer and 
may make male offspring infertile themselves (Aitken and Krausz 2001, 502-504), there is considerable 
cause for concern. 
 Large scale DNA damage may result in either non-fertilization or that the embryo will fail to 
develop properly and therefore not be carried to term (Robinson et al. 2012, 2911). However, given that 
single base changes in DNA (single nucleotide polymorphisms) can result in increases in the incidence of 
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outcomes such as autism spectrum disorders and schizophrenia (Kong et al. 2012, 473), the effect that 
small scale DNA changes can have on the resulting child should not be underestimated. What is apparent is 
that the physical long-term health effects on people conceived using donated gametes is somewhat unclear 
and further research needs to be conducted. 
 What is apparent is that Robertson’s broad procreative freedom is too broad because his 
assumption that conception usually causes no harm and that the risk is speculative is flawed as the 
aforementioned potential physical harms occur during the conception processes associated with DC. While 
outcomes such as pre-eclampsia can be treated, the incidence of pre-eclampsia occurring in the next 
generation is also increased (Esplin et al. 2001, 869), and the resultant child has an elevated risk of 
developing cardiovascular disease and diabetes in adulthood (Simmons 2009). The effects of conception 
can have far reaching and long-term effects with what is now a widely accepted concept known as the fetal 
origins of adult disease (Barker 1990, 1111).  
 The potential physical harm outcome is analogous to the incomplete medical history harm and 
subsequently fails the future-agent-focus test. 
vii) Consanguineous Relationships 
Australia precludes consanguineous relationships on moral and biological grounds, and is 
prohibited by the Australian Marriage Act (Commonwealth of Australia 1961, s23). The current ability of 
donor offspring to know who their siblings and half-siblings are is severely hampered. Not only must they 
have been informed of their conception status, they must also have access to the identity of their donor’s 
biological children born via other donations as well as ‘natural’ children. While current practice restricts 
the number of recipient families for one donor, for those conceived before restrictions were imposed, there 
was little concern for the possibility of a consanguine event and with records showing the number of 
donations for some donors exceeding several hundred (Donor Conception Support Group of Australia 2011, 
103-104), there is the very real potential for a donor offspring to have numerous siblings. A compounding 
factor for these children is that they are often born within a relatively short time-frame when compared to 
normal sibship construction and generally occurs within geographical boundaries. Coupled with a sizable 
proportion of a person’s behavior and attributes that are inherited, there is a possibility that these offspring 
could meet through vocational interests. There has been very little achieved apart from a reduction in the 
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number of families assisted, to prevent consanguinity from occurring even though it was recognised as a 
concern over 30 years ago (Curie-Cohen, Luttrell, and Shapiro 1979, 589). 
 Exacerbating the problem is the possibility of genetic sexual attraction (Gonyo 1987, 1; Greenberg 
1993, 5-17) whereby kin who have been separated since birth or conception become attracted to each other 
due to shared similarities, which normally is quashed due to the Westermarck effect (Westermarck 1921) of 
co-habitation in early childhood. Removing co-habitation as can occur in donor offspring potentially also 
removes the kin recognition model of the persons involved and their aversion to consanguinity with the 
other person which is non-conscious and predicated by their cohabitation and not their beliefs (Leiberman, 
Tooby, and Cosmides 2003, 825). The onus is then forced on the offspring themselves to ask all potential 
partners of their conception status and to possibly test them genetically to ensure that they are not related, 
provided that they know of their mode of conception themselves. Emotional and financial burdens of 
ensuring non-consanguinity is already being carried by donor offspring but is not being addressed by the 
states or clinics that hold records that can prevent such an event from occurring. Recently the concern has 
been highlighted by the Federal and Victorian inquiries (SLCAC 2011, 101; VLRC 2012, 111-112). 
 Knowledge of kinship reduces the total number of possible relationships a person is able to have 
when consanguinity is entered into the equation even though the reduction in number is insignificant. At 
first glance this would appear to be counter to one component of the future-agent-focus test which is 
concerned with not closing certain doors and keeping as many options as possible open. However, the other 
component of this parental virtue is to ensure that the child develops into a future moral agent with 
appropriate virtues which would include being law abiding citizens. Balancing these two outcomes would 
see the virtuous law abiding agent component as having greater weight than would the removal of the small 
number of relationship options. Hence the possibility to form a consanguineous relationship by not having 
knowledge of all next-of-kin fails the future-agent-focus test. 
 
Reconceptualising the Paradigm 
The outcomes outlined earlier are an analysis of possible (as not all children are equally affected) 
downstream effects of procreative freedoms which should then be used as a framework for discussing how 
these potential effects might influence policy and paradigm reconceptualisation. As such, means of 
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accommodating the welfare of the child for each of the potential harms in a pragmatic context will not be 
discussed as it is outside the scope of this paper. 
 In addressing the question of whether adults have freedom of choice in DC reproduction, the 
current situation follows a Robertson procreative freedom although it is somewhat constrained to fit within 
the refined legalised and practical freedom described earlier. However, if we apply the 3PVs then it is 
apparent that the current paradigm fails to be ethically virtuous in a neo-Aristotelian way and that the 
freedom is in fact too free.  
 Concurrently the parent’s freedom of reproductive choice is also being restricted. They are being 
denied through the current DC practice bureaucracy of having the procreative freedom, in the neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics sense described by McDougall, to be the virtuous parents that they may choose to 
be. This is based on the assumption that a virtuous parent would assess the potential harms that could 
adversely impact on their donor conceived child and make the appropriate decisions and subsequent actions 
to ameliorate or reduce those possibilities. Therefore the paradigm should be altered so that parents have 
the ability to make choices such as providing information and access if so desired, and thereby reclaim the 
autonomy that they are being deprived.  
 Supporting such a frame-shift also comes from the offspring themselves. Evidence from studies of 
adult offspring’s perceptions shows that some are distressed with these current procreative choices and that 
they can be adversely affected physically, mentally and emotionally (Turner and Coyle 2000, 2049-2050; 
Lorbach 2003, 153-191; McWhinnie 2006, 59-61 Victorian Law Reform Commission 2007, 37). 
Additionally, what was originally deemed appropriate to fit an adult’s own agenda may not fit with the 
welfare of the child (McWhinnie 2001, 815). While progress is slow and the welfare of the child is still not 
being placed as the primary concern, Australia has moved to an identifiable only donor paradigm while 
elsewhere there is also an increase in the usage of identifiable donors (Greenfeld 2008, 267). This shows a 
donor conception culture that is in transition (Daniels 2007, 124), reflecting the research findings of donor 
offspring experiences. Additionally, some offspring are resorting to lobbying for legislative change, paying 
for DNA tests and forming social support groups to help each other deal with the effects of current and past 
procreative freedoms (Adams and Lorbach 2012, 710-718).   
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 There are no regulatory or legislative impositions on adults as to when or how they procreate 
using normal biological means, and provided that they meet eligibility criteria and are able to pay certain 
costs, there are no restrictions to their access to fertility treatment either. I posit that reproductive choice, 
constrained by child welfare interests does not significantly diminish this freedom. With appropriate 
reconceptualisation of the paradigm virtuous parents could still have a family through DC and use 
appropriate parental decisions to help ameliorate some of the potential harms their children could face, 
although the possibility of avoiding the unknown physical harms is somewhat more problematic.  
 Social change however is creating a push for increased reproductive choice and freedoms. 
Increasing reproductive freedom in these instances is diametrically opposed to an improvement in the 
conceptualised welfare of the offspring. Somerville (2007, 181) argues that children from reproductive 
technologies such as DC have been failed by the processes that create them in so much as that many of the 
possible consequences to the child have been neglected because they are desirable objects and a component 
of big business. This argument shows how freedom of procreation coupled with deep rooted desires to 
procreate can be utilised for commercial gain while ignoring the actual product that they create.  
 When balancing the opposing rights of individuals or parties, ethically we should provide 
protection to the party that is most vulnerable, which in donor conception it is the child as recognised 
through various legislation and regulation. In the issue of welfare, the child’s rights must take precedence 
and override those of the adult’s (Gollancz 2001, 165). While it may be argued that some children are 
naturally born into scenarios where they may be equally disadvantaged, it does not automatically provide 
ethical approval of these harms and justification of the children being a means to an end in a state 
sanctioned manner (Laing and Oderberg 2005, 342-356). Chisholm (2012, 735) describes this means to an 
end argument as counter to the Kantian principle, the principle of humanity, in which people should never 
be treated as a means to an end. Privacy concerns and other agendas of the adults involved should be 
outweighed by the possible negative consequences of withholding such information and it also violates the 
offspring’s autonomy (McGee et al. 2001, 2035). Such a moral countenance supports reconceptualisation 
of the donor conception paradigm. 
 While some legislative efforts have been enacted to cater for the welfare of offspring and their 
right to a genetic heritage and knowledge of their progenitors, these efforts have been suppressed to cater 
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for the desires of the infertile (van den Akker 2006, 98). Public funding of fertility treatments imposes a 
greater level of responsibility than would otherwise occur due to the community investment and the 
intentionality of the process, thereby the duty of care and welfare of the child principles should indeed 
restrict freedom of choice in DC reproduction. 
 It could be argued that no matter how much the paradigm was reconceptualised towards a child 
centric model that there will always be some children that will be unhappy or harmed by their method of 
conception and that therefore the whole practice of DC should be banned and this procreative 
freedom/choice be removed. Such arguments are counterproductive as DC has been in practice for a long 
time, has been accepted by a large portion of Australian society, is entrenched as a common fertility 
treatment and is enshrined in legislation and regulation as an acceptable procreative freedom. However, due 
to the child welfare paramountcy principle, these freedoms do not have to follow the broad Robertson 
definition with an anything goes approach but rather there is an intrinsic legal obligation of the states to 
ensure that an appropriate paradigm is implemented that acknowledges this freedom but constrains it in the 
interests of not only child welfare but also the interests of the parents to allow them to be as virtuous as 
possible. As such a child centric model has the potential to improve the outcomes for not only the child but 
also the parent. 
 
Conclusion 
Acknowledging the harm and consequences that may have occurred and may continue to occur as 
a direct result of the implementation of previous and current models of DC is the first step towards 
addressing the question of whether adults should have unmitigated freedom of procreation using DC. 
Shifting the focus of these models to a child centric paradigm will enable society to ameliorate some of the 
potential harms outlined. The child welfare paramountcy principle should be adopted by all jurisdictions 
rather than just a few and reproductive freedoms utilising DC must not be absolute but restrained to cater 
for this welfare as an intrinsic applied principle. The purpose of this discussion is not to propose a specific 
model that will meet the needs of the Donated Generation in an ethical and moralistic manner, but rather to 
provide a framework of fields that require investigation and critical debate in the formation of a child 
enabling model incorporating the freedoms deprived of these people. It is shown that the 3 Parental Virtues 
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can possibly be used as a means for conducting this analysis and aid reconcepualisation based on child 
welfare paramountcy in a neo-Aristotelian manner.  
 
Competing Interests: The author is an advocate of and lobbies for equitable treatment of donor conceived 
people. 
 
Funding support: Nil 
 
20 
 
References 
 
Adams, D., and C. Lorbach. 2012. Accessing donor conception information in Australia: A call for 
retrospective access. Journal of Law and Medicine 19(4): 707-721. 
 
Aitken R.J., and C. Krausz. 2001. Oxidative stress, DNA damage and the Y chromosome. Reproduction 
122(4):497-506. 
 
Annas, G. J. 1981. Fathers anonymous: beyond the best interests of the sperm donor. Child Welfare 60(3): 
161-174. 
 
Backes, C.H., K. Markham, P. Moorehead, L. Cordero, C.A. Nankervis, and P.J. Giannone. 2011. Maternal 
preeclampsia and neonatal outcomes. Journal of Pregnancy 2011: 214365.  
 
Barker, D.J. 1990. The fetal and infant origins of adult disease. British Medical Journal 301(6761): 1111. 
 
Blyth, E., and I. Ryll. 2005. Why wouldn’t you tell? Telling donor-conceived children about their 
conception. Health Ethics Today 15(1): 4. 
 
Brandon, J., and J. Warner. 1977. AID and adoption: some comparisons. British Journal of Social Work 
7(3): 335-341. 
 
Brewaeys, A., S. Golombok, N. Naaktgeboren, J. K. de Bruyn, and E. V. van Hall. 1997. Donor 
insemination: Dutch parents’ opinions about confidentiality and donor anonymity and the emotional 
adjustment of their children. Human Reproduction 12: 1591–1597. 
 
Broderick, P., and I. Walker. 2001. Donor gametes and embryos: who wants to know what about whom, 
and why? Politics and the Life Sciences 20(1): 29-42. 
21 
 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 2004. Awareness of family health history as a risk 
factor for disease--United States, 2004. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 53(44): 1044-1047. 
 
Chisholm, R. 2012. Information rights and donor conception: Lessons from adoption? Journal of Law and 
Medicine 19(4): 722-741. 
 
Commonwealth of Australia. 1961. Federal Marriage Act s 23B. 
 
Cooper, S. L. and E. S. Glazer. 1994. Beyond infertility: the new paths to parenthood. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
 
Cowden, M. 2012. ‘No Harm, no Foul’: A Child’s Right to Know their Genetic Parents. International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 26(1): 102-126. 
 
Curie-Cohen, M., L. Luttrell, and S. Shapiro. 1979. Current practice of artificial insemination by donor in 
the United States. New England Journal of Medicine 300(11): 585-590. 
 
Daniels, K. R. 2004. Building a family with the assistance of donor insemination. Palmerston North, New 
Zealand: Dunmore Press Ltd. 
 
Daniels, K. 2007. Donor gametes: anonymous or identified? Best Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology 21(1): 113-128. 
 
Daniels, K., W. Gillett, and V. Grace. 2009. Parental information sharing with donor insemination 
conceived offspring: a follow-up study. Human Reproduction 24(5): 1099-1105. 
 
22 
 
Donor Conception Support Group. 2011. Submission 122. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee, 2011. Donor Conception Practices in Australia (Senate Report).  
 
Durna, E. M., J. Bebe, S. J. Steigrad, L. R. Leader, and D. G. Garrett. 1997. Donor insemination: attitudes 
of parents towards disclosure. Medical Journal of Australia 167(5): 256-259. 
 
Erikson, E. 1968. Identity: youth in crisis. New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Esplin, M.S., M.B. Fausett, A. Fraser, R. Kerber, G. Mineau, J. Carrillo, and M.W. Varner. 2001. Paternal 
and maternal components of the predisposition to preeclampsia. New England Journal of Medicine 
344(12): 867-872. 
 
Freeman, M. 1996. The new birth right? Identity and the child of the reproduction revolution. International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 4: 273-297. 
 
Freeman, T., and S. Golombok. 2012. Donor insemination: a follow-up study of disclosure decisions, 
family relationships and child adjustment at adolescence. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 25(2): 193-203. 
 
Frith, L. 2001. Beneath the rhetoric: the role of rights in the practice of non-anonymous gamete donation. 
Bioethics 15(5-6): 473-484. 
 
Godman, K. M., K. Sanders, M. Rosenberg, and P. Burton. 2006. Potential sperm donors', recipients' and 
their partners' opinions towards the release of identifying information in Western Australia. Human 
Reproduction 21(11): 3022-3026. 
 
Gollancz, D. 2001. Donor insemination: a question of rights. Human Fertility (Cambridge) 4(3): 164-167. 
 
23 
 
Golombok, S., F. MacCallum, E. Goodman, and M. Rutter. 2002. Families with children conceived by 
donor insemination: a follow-up at age twelve. Child Development 73: 952-968. 
 
Gonyo, B. 1987. Genetic sexual attraction. American Adoption Congress Newsletter 4(2): 1. 
 
Gosálvez, J., E. Cortés-Gutierez, C. López-Fernández, J.L. Fernández, P. Caballero, and R. Nuñez. 2009. 
Sperm deoxyribonucleic acid fragmentation dynamics in fertile donors. Fertility and Sterility 92(1): 170-
173.  
 
Greenberg, M. 1993. Post adoption reunion – are we entering uncharted territory? Adoption and Fostering 
17: 5-17. 
 
Greenfeld, D. A. 2008. The impact of disclosure on donor gamete participants: donors, intended parents 
and offspring. Current Opinion in Obstetrics and Gynecology 20(3): 265-268. 
 
Hastrup, J. L. 1985. Inaccuracy of family health information: implications for prevention. Health 
Psychology 4(4): 389-397. 
 
Hewitt, G. 2002. Missing links: Identity issues of donor-conceived people. Journal of Fertility Counselling 
9(3): 14-20. 
 
Jadva, V., T. Freeman, W. Kramer, and S. Golombok. 2009. The experiences of adolescents and adults 
conceived by sperm donation: comparisons by age of disclosure and family type. Human Reproduction 
24(8): 1909-1919. 
 
Jadva, V., T. Freeman, W. Kramer, and S. Golombok. 2010. Experiences of offspring searching for and 
contacting their donor siblings and donor. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 20(4): 523-532. 
 
24 
 
Johnson, L., and H. Kane. 2007. Regulation of donor conception and the "time to tell" campaign. Journal of 
Law and Medicine 15(1): 117-127. 
 
Kirkman, M. 2003. Parents' contributions to the narrative identity of offspring of donor-assisted conception. 
Social Science and Medicine 57(11): 2229-2242. 
 
Klock, S. C., M. C. Jacob, and D. Maier. 1994. A prospective study of donor insemination recipients: 
secrecy, privacy, and disclosure. Fertility and Sterility 62(3): 477-484. 
 
Kong, A., M.L. Frigge, G. Masson, S. Besenbacher, P. Sulem, G. Magnusson, S.A. Gudjonsson, A. 
Sigurdsson, A. Jonasdottir, A. Jonasdottir, W.S. Wong, G. Sigurdsson, G.B. Walters, S. Steinberg, H. 
Helgason, G. Thorleifsson, D.F. Gudbjartsson, A. Helgason, O.T. Magnusson, U. Thorsteinsdottir, and K. 
Stefansson. 2012. Rate of de novo mutations and the importance of father's age to disease risk. Nature 
488(7412): 471-475. 
 
Kyrou, D., E.M. Kolibianakis, P. Devroey, and H.M. Fatemi. 2010. Is the use of donor sperm associated 
with a higher incidence of preeclampsia in women who achieve pregnancy after intrauterine insemination? 
Fertility and Sterility 93(4):1124-1127.  
 
Laing, J. A., and D. S. Oderberg. 2005. Artificial Reproduction, the ‘Welfare Principle’, and the Common 
Good. Medical Law Review 13(3): 328-356. 
 
Landau, R. 1998. Secrecy, anonymity, and deception in donor insemination: a genetic, psycho-social and 
ethical critique. Social Work in Health Care 28(1): 75-89. 
 
Leeton, J., and J. Backwell. 1982. A preliminary psychosocial follow-up of parents and their children 
conceived by artificial insemination by donor (AID). Clinical Reproduction and Fertility 1(4): 307-310. 
 
25 
 
Lieberman, D., J. Tooby, and L. Cosmides. 2003. Does morality have a biological basis? An empirical test 
of the factors governing moral sentiments relating to incest. Proceedings Biological Sciences 270(1517): 
819-826. 
 
Lorbach, C. 2003. Experiences of donor conception: Parents, offspring, and donors throughout the years. 
London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
 
Lycett, E., K. Daniels, R. Curson, and S. Golombok. 2005. School-aged children of donor insemination: a 
study of parents’ disclosure patterns. Human Reproduction 20: 810–819. 
 
MacDougall, K., G. Becker, J. E. Scheib, and R. D. Nachtigall. 2007. Strategies for disclosure: how parents 
approach telling their children that they were conceived with donor gametes. Fertility and Sterility 87(3): 
524-533. 
 
Mahlstedt, P. P., and K. A. Probasco. 1991. Sperm donors: their attitudes toward providing medical and 
psychosocial information for recipient couples and donor offspring. Fertility and Sterility 56(4): 747-753. 
 
Mahlstedt P. P., K. Labounty, and W. T. Kennedy. 2010. The views of adult offspring of sperm donation: 
essential feedback for the development of ethical guidelines within the practice of assisted reproductive 
technology in the United States. Fertility and Sterility 93(7): 2236-2246. 
 
Malouff, J. M., S. E. Rooke, and N. S. Schutte. 2008. The heritability of human behaviour: results of 
aggregating meta-analyses. Current Psychology 27(3): 153-161. 
 
McDougall, R. 2007. Parental virtue: a new way of thinking about the morality of reproductive actions. 
Bioethics 21(4): 181-190. 
 
26 
 
McGee, G., S. V. Brakman, and A. D. Gurmankin. 2001. Gamete donation and anonymity: disclosure to 
children conceived with donor gametes should not be optional. Human Reproduction 16(10): 2033-2036. 
 
McWhinnie, A. 2000. Families from assisted conception: ethical and psychological issues. Human Fertility 
(Cambridge) 3(1): 13-19. 
 
McWhinnie, A. 2001. Gamete donation and anonymity: should offspring from donated gametes continue to 
be denied knowledge of their origins and antecedents? Human Reproduction 16(5): 807-817. 
 
McWhinnie, A. 2006. Who am I? Experiences of donor conception. Warwickshire, UK: Idreos Eductional 
Trust. 
 
Milsom, I., and P. Bergman. 1982. A study of parental attitudes after donor insemination (AID).  Acta 
Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica 61(2): 125-128. 
 
Murray, C., and S. Golombok. 2003. To tell or not to tell: the decision-making process of egg-donation 
parents. Human Fertility (Cambridge) 6(2): 89-95. 
 
National Health and Medical Research Council. 2004. Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted 
reproductive technology in clinical practice and research. Australian Government: National Health and 
Medical Research Council. 
 
New South Wales. 2007. Assisted Reproductive Technology Act. 
 
Paul, M. S., and R. Berger. 2007. Topic avoidance and family functioning in families conceived with donor 
insemination. Human Reproduction 22(9): 2566-2571. 
 
27 
 
Riley, H. 2009. Listening to late discovery adoption and donor offspring stories : adoption, ethics and 
implications for contemporary donor insemination practices. In: Spark, Ceridwen and Cuthbert, Denise 
(Eds.) Other People's Children : Adoption in Australia. Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, Melbourne, Victoria. 
 
Robertson, J.A. 1983. Procreative liberty and the control of conception, pregnancy, and childbirth. Virginia 
Law Review 69(3): 405-464. 
 
Robinson, J. N., R. G. Forman, A. M. Clark, D. M. Egan, M. G. Chapman, and D. H. Barlow. 1991. 
Attitudes of donors and recipients to gamete donation. Human Reproduction 6(2): 307-309. 
 
Robinson, L., I.D. Gallos, S.J. Conner, M. Rajkhowa, D. Miller, S. Lewis, J. Kirkman-Brown, and A. 
Coomarasamy. 2012. The effect of sperm DNA fragmentation on miscarriage rates: a systematic review 
and meta-analysis. Human Reproduction 27(10): 2908-2917. 
 
Rose, J. 2009. A critical analysis of sperm donation practices: the personal and social effects of disrupting 
the unity of biological and social relatedness for the offspring. Brisbane: Queensland University of 
Technology. 
 
Rowland, R. 1985. The social and psychological consequences of secrecy in artificial insemination by 
donor (AID) programmes. Social Science and Medicine 21(4): 391-396. 
 
Rumball, A., and V. Adair. 1999. Telling the story: parents' scripts for donor offspring. Human 
Reproduction 14(5): 1392-1399. 
 
Salha, O., V. Sharma, T. Dada, D. Nugent, A.J. Rutherford, A.J. Tomlinson, S. Philips, V. Allgar, and J.J. 
Walker. 1999. The influence of donated gametes on the incidence of hypertensive disorders of pregnancy. 
Human Reproduction 14(9): 2268-2273. 
28 
 
 Sants, H. J. 1964. Genealogical bewilderment in children with substitute parents. British Journal of 
Medical Psychology 37: 133-141. 
 
Scheib, J. E., M. Riordan, and S. Rubin. 2005. Adolescents with open identity sperm donors: reports from 
12-17 year olds. Human Reproduction 20(1): 239-252. 
 
Schneller, E. A. 2005. The rights of donor inseminated children to know their genetic origins in Australia. 
Australian Journal of Family Law 19(3): 222-244. 
 
Schover, L. R., A. J. Thomas, K. F. Miller, T. Falcone, M Attaran, and J. Goldberg. 1996. Preferences for 
intracytoplasmic sperm injection versus donor insemination in severe male factor infertility: a preliminary 
report. Human Reproduction 11(11): 2461-2464. 
 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. 2011. Donor conception practices in Australia. 
Canberra: Australian Government. 
 
Shehab, D., J. Duff, L. A. Pasch, K. MacDougall, J. E. Scheib, and R. D. Nachtigall. 2008. How parents 
whose children have been conceived with donor gametes make their disclosure decision: contexts, 
influences, and couple dynamics. Fertility and Sterility 89(1): 179-187. 
 
Simmons, R.A. 2009. Developmental origins of adult disease. Pediatric Clinics of North America 56(3): 
449–466. 
 
Simon, L., J. Castillo, R. Oliva, and S.E. Lewis. 2011. Relationships between human sperm protamines, 
DNA damage and assisted reproduction outcomes. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 23(6): 724-734.  
 
29 
 
Smith, G.N., M. Walker, J.L. Tessier, and K.G. Millar. 1997. Increased incidence of preeclampsia in 
women conceiving by intrauterine insemination with donor versus partner sperm for treatment of primary 
infertility. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 177(2): 455-458. 
 
Somerville, M. 2007. Children's human rights and unlinking child-parent biological bonds with adoption, 
same-sex marriage and new reproductive technologies. Journal of Family Studies 13(2): 179-201. 
 
South Australia. 1988. Reproductive Technologies (Clinical Practices) Act. 
 
Thomson, L.K., S.D. Fleming, R.J. Aitken, G.N. De Iuliis, J.A. Zieschang, and A.M. Clark. 2009. 
Cryopreservation-induced human sperm DNA damage is predominantly mediated by oxidative stress rather 
than apoptosis. Human Reproduction 24(9):2061-2070.  
 
Toro, E., S. Fernández, A. Colomar, A. Casanovas, J.G. Alvarez, M. López-Teijón, and E. Velilla. 2009. 
Processing of semen can result in increased sperm DNA fragmentation. Fertility and Sterility 92(6): 2109-
2112.  
 
Turner, A. J., and A. Coyle. 2000. What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences of 
adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications for counselling and therapy. Human 
Reproduction 15(9): 2041-2051. 
 
van den Akker, O. 2006. A review of family donor constructs: current research and future directions. 
Human Reproduction Update 12(2): 91-101. 
 
Vetri, D. 1988. Reproductive technologies and United States law. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 37: 505-534. 
 
Victoria. 1995. Infertility Treatment Act. 
30 
 
31 
 
 
Victorian Law Reform Commission. 2007. Assisted reproductive technology and adoption: final report. 
Victoria: Victorian Government Printer. 
 
Victorian Law Reform Committee, 2012 Inquiry into access by donor conceived people to information 
about the donors. Victoria: Victorian Government Printer. 
 
Walker, M. 2006. Misconception. Australian Rationalist 75/76: 23-27. 
 
Warnock, M. 1987. The good of the child. Bioethics 1(2): 141-155. 
 
Weigert, A. J., and R. Hastings. 1977. Identity loss, family, and social change. American Journal of 
Sociology 82(6): 1171-1185. 
 
Westermarck, E. A. 1921. The history of human marriage. London: Macmillan. 
 
Western Australia. 1991. Human Reproductive Technology Act. 
 
Yamauchi, Y., J.M. Riel, and M.A. Ward. 2012. Paternal DNA damage resulting from various sperm 
treatments persists after fertilization and is similar before and after DNA replication. Journal of Andrology 
33(2): 229-238. 
 
Zribi, N., N. Feki Chakroun, H. El Euch, J. Gargouri, A. Bahloul, and L. Ammar Keskes. 2010. Effects of 
cryopreservation on human sperm deoxyribonucleic acid integrity. Fertility and Sterility 93(1): 159-166.  
 
 
 
 
